In what has been described as one of the greatest displays of military genius in history, MacArthur had attacked the enemy’s rear with an impossible amphibious assault at Inchon far up the Korean Peninsula, driven the communists pell-mell to the Manchurian border, and, remarkably, in eight weeks’ time, liberated South Korea, which was his objective, and North Korea, which was above and beyond the call of duty. In the process, relatively few Americans (compared to what followed) lost their lives. It was a fantastic victory. (1)
There was due cause for celebration.
But the celebration never came. Communist China, frenzied over its loss, massed its hordes upon the borders of North Korea at the Yalu River and began to flood its men, tanks, and military hardware (Japanese military hardware acquired from Russia, which received it as a post-WWII gift from Truman) over the Yalu River bridges, head-on into North Korea, and MacArthur and his men. A new war began in earnest.
The solution for MacArthur and company was simple. Bomb the bridges. Communist China lacked the technological ability to successfully launch an invasion across the river without them.
Common military sense, a respect for human life on both sides of the conflict, the granting of time to secure Korean liberty, all bore witness that this was the intelligent, the moral, the instinctive thing to do.
But intelligence, morality, and instinct somehow managed to flee from Korea from that moment forward. President Harry Truman and a shady list of State Department buddies were not very happy with MacArthur’s success. Pretending that MacArthur had not been fighting the Chinese all along, and that his actions would provoke China into the war, MacArthur was incredibly ordered not to bomb the bridges, and thus not to adequately protect his men and his victory against an enormous invading force. Call it what you will, Democrat Harry Truman ordered the abandonment of our troops in the field and altered the methods and objectives of war, and in particular this war, which was supposedly fought to stop the spread of Communism.
The bloodiest battles of the Korean War ensued. Tens of thousands of American soldiers died; North Korea had its recently-won liberty revoked; and General MacArthur was dismissed as an American rebel (even a Caesar) for first winning a war and then voicing a legitimate protest, through proper channels, when the tables were turned by design and his men, American men and boys, were declared open game.
Truman, a dedicated internationalist and the man who started this war without the consent of Congress, was the true Caesar and a traitor to his people. Not only did he permit China to launch a full-scale invasion against Americans which could have been averted, but he then gave these Communists other advantages by further altering the rules and objectives of war.
Among these was the outrageous implementation of what today we call “U.N. Safe Areas,” what was called in Vietnam the “Demilitarized Zone.” This was a place where the enemy, after launching its vicious volleys, could run and hide without fear of reprisal. It was against the law for Americans to kill and maim there, but the Chinese could kill and maim Americans at their leisure. (2) Call it military socialism, an attempt to level the playing field, converting handicap into privilege, bestowing an unwarranted advantage on an unworthy and unholy opponent who wouldn’t have stood a chance otherwise, as if to pretend this was some sort of competitive sport where parity only added to the excitement.
This aid-to-the-enemy strategy also forbade enlisting the volunteer help of Chinese Nationalists who were anxious to strike back at their communist masters. After MacArthur was booted out, this strategy included abandoning the historical and universal tactical objective of acquiring territory in favor of repeatedly and intentionally requiring our troops to retreat and abandon strategic territory that had been won with blood, sweat, and tears. (3)
Measures like these went beyond ignorance and lunacy. MacArthur asserted later:
I realized for the first time that I had actually been denied the use of my full military power to safeguard the lives of my soldiers and the safety of my army.
Such a limitation on the utilization of available military force to repel an enemy attack has no precedent, either in our own history, or, so far as I know, in the history of the world. (4)
A fellow general, Mark Clark, took the point to its logical conclusion: “Perhaps communists had wormed their way deeply into our government.” (5)
Later investigations into the State Department and the Truman administration added fuel to that claim. Some of those communists, however, worked not in Washington but in Manhattan at the headquarters of that world “peace” organization we call the United Nations, under whose direction and blessing this war was launched and fought.
John F. McManus, in his hard-hitting exposé Changing Commands: The Betrayal of America’s Military, explained what happens when we join with communists in a “peace” organization:
It was Soviet U.N. Official, General Yuri Vasilev, [who] left his post at U.N. headquarters in … January 1950 and moved to North Korea [in order to] direct the military buildup of the communist forces [in North Korea]. A U.S. department of Defense release of May 15, 1954, even claimed that Vasilev had given the order in 1950 for the North Koreans to invade.
That was bad enough, but then came this bombshell:
All military directives sent from Washington and the Pentagon to military commanders in Korea were also supplied to several offices at the U.N., including the Military Staff Committee, formerly led by Vasilev and later by another Soviet General, Ivan Skliar. Everything the U.S. commanders were doing was known to communist leaders even before actions were taken.
Generals James Van Fleet and MacArthur, testifying before Congress, were convinced this was so, and were also convinced, said Van Fleet, that “there must have been information to the enemy from high diplomatic authorities that we would not attack his home base across the Yalu.” (6) Evidence emerged. Chinese General Lin Pia, the commander of the Chinese troops who slaughtered so many Americans, revealed in a leaflet distributed in China:
I would never have made the attack and risked my men and military reputation if I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from taking adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and communication. (7)
If MacArthur had been permitted to bomb the bridges, as was his plan, the war would have been over, North Korea would be free today — not a threat, tens of thousands of American soldiers would have come home to a victory parade rather than a funeral procession, communism would have been put on notice to watch its step, and MacArthur would be remembered for what he was — a true American hero.
But then, good things like that don’t happen when you join hands with thugs, communists, and international terrorists and dare to call your band a peacekeeping organization. And so the communists won (in the North), American soldiers died, thousands of POWs were abandoned (to this day), and an international standing army was installed in South Korea as a check against the instability of a third-rate criminal ring in North Korea. That criminal ring annually starves its people, threatens its neighbors, and continues to receive heavy fuel from the United States (dating back to 1995) and food subsidies from the United Nations organization (courtesy of the U.S. taxpayers).
Certainly, General Douglas MacArthur and the thousands of American men and boys who fought and bled in that unhappy battlefield of Korea cry from the dust in protest.
Steve Farrell is one of the original pundits at Silver Eddy Award Winner, NewsMax.com (1999–2008), associate professor of political economy at George Wythe University, the author of the highly praised inspirational novel Dark Rose, and editor in chief of The Moral Liberal.
1. Stormer, John A. None Dare Call It Treason, The Liberty Bell Press, Missouri, 1964.
3. McManus, John F. Changing Commands: The Betrayal of America’s Military, The John Birch Society, Appleton, Wisconsin.
4. MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences, New York Times Inc., New York, 1964.
5. Clark, Mark. From the Danube To the Yalu, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954.
6. Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, Hearings, U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 1954; Military Situation in the Far East, Committee on Armed Forces, 1951.
7. MacArthur, Reminiscences. New York Times Inc., New York, 1964.