When Supreme Court justice Ketanji Brown Jackson claimed she couldn’t define “woman” during her confirmation hearings in 2022, it created quite a stir. The story only would’ve been better if Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), who’d asked the then-judicial nominee to define the term, had followed up with, “Are you a woman, Judge Jackson?” The follow-up to that then should’ve been:
“How do you know?”
As Mark Twain noted, however, “A good answer is the one you think of later.” This is also true of good questions.
Of course, it’s a safe bet that Jackson knows she’s a woman. Perhaps, if she had time to formulate an answer, she might echo Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s famous line about identifying pornography. “I know it when I see it,” he said in the 1964 Jacobellis v. Ohio case.
But it’s a sign of the times — with its MUSS (Made-up Sexual Status, aka “transgender”) agenda — that Jackson even had to be asked such a question.
It’s also a sign of the times that she demurred when it was posed. Just as leftists are famous for “situational values,” what she exhibited could be called situational confusion or situational ignorance. After all, when she identified her sex on official documents years back — mindful of the affirmative action she could benefit from — she no doubt could check the “female” box with complete assuredness.
But this situational ignorance is in vogue, as evidenced by how Microsoft Network has chosen to run an article titled “Scientists Claim There Is Not a ‘Simple’ Answer to Define ‘Woman.’” In fact, despite it being an older piece, MSN posted it (again?) just the other day.
To some, of course, this may seem like much ado about nothing. But since young children are now being told they can switch sexes and no small number of people claim that “woman” is a nebulous (and not just nattering) entity, let’s without further ado define the term:
A woman is an adult member of the species Homo sapiens who is, in principle, genotypically and phenotypically female. Full stop.
Now, for the sexual devolutionaries who’d disagree, I’ll be kind and give a heads-up: Before disputing the above, read it with discernment, as the words were chosen carefully, lest you end up with egg on your face (an egg is, you know, that thing that females also, in principle, produce.) But we’ll get back to this later.
As for the aforementioned article, penned by one Julie Hambleton, it opens with:
What is a woman? Or rather, what defines someone as a woman? Ask 100 women, and you might get 100 different answers [asking one liberal woman at 100 different times might also yield 100 different answers]. This is because there are a variety of contexts in which you could define a woman, and within each of these contexts, there will still not be one straight answer. Socially or biologically, there is still so much variation.
The last sentence is assuredly true. There’s also tremendous biological variation among dogs, cats, or birds. Thus could one wonder: Can Hambleton tell us what kind of pet she has?
Commenting on Judge Jackson’s “woman” confusion, Hambleton goes on to claim, “Many scientists, biologists, and gender law scholars have commended Jackson for her response.”
The writer then proceeds to cite:
- Rebecca Jordan-Young, whom Hambleton describes as “a scientists [sic] and gender studies scholar.” It wasn’t easy finding out what Young’s Ph.D. was in, but I finally discovered that it was in something called “Sociomedical Sciences.” Bing relates that this field “is dedicated to understanding and addressing the social, political, historical, cultural, psychological, and economic forces that influence health outcomes.” So some may say Young sounds like a glorified sociologist.
- “Gender studies professor Kate Mason” — who is a (unglorified) sociologist.
- “Scholar” Sarah Richardson, whose bio states she’s an “Aramont Professor of the History of Science and Professor of Studies of Women, Gender, and Sexuality at Harvard University.” Hambleton describes her as a “philosopher of biology.” Note here that you’ll probably never see a “philosopher of tennis” win Wimbledon.
And that’s it. In other words, Hambleton couldn’t cite even one of the “many” (situationally ignorant) biologists she claimed were in her camp.
She does go on to write, though, that in “terms of biology, there are at least six different markers for ‘sex’. This includes genitals, gonads, chromosomes, internal reproductive organs, hormones, and their levels, and secondary sex characteristics. These markers don’t always align, however, and aren’t necessarily opposite or completely different.”
This is a common argument that sways many. It’s also irrelevant. This brings us back to my definition. Again:
A woman is an adult member of the species Homo sapiens who is, in principle, genotypically and phenotypically female.
Note the words “in principle.” If Hambleton had interviewed a member of that endangered species known as a “good philosopher,” she might have learned there’s a difference between something being true in principle and it being true in the particular. For example, a human being is in principle a life form who (among other things) has two arms and two legs, and that a human is occasionally born with only one arm and two legs doesn’t discredit this definition. It is particular (and abnormal) variation that has no bearing on the general rule.
Embracing the notion that particular variation negates in-principle definitions would seriously hamper communication. For how many categorical things in life are wholly without variation?
